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Abstract
We demonstrate how easy it is for modern
machine-learned systems to violate common
deontological ethical principles and social
norms such as “favor the less fortunate,” and
“do not penalize good attributes.” We propose
that in some cases such ethical principles can
be incorporated into a machine-learned model
by adding shape constraints that constrain
the model to respond only positively to rel-
evant inputs. We analyze the relationship
between these deontological constraints that
act on individuals and the consequentialist
group-based fairness goals of one-sided sta-
tistical parity and equal opportunity. This
strategy works with sensitive attributes that
are Boolean or real-valued such as income and
age, and can help produce more responsible
and trustworthy AI.
1 Introduction
As the use of machine-learned (ML) models broadens,
strategies are sought to ensure machine-learned systems
behave responsibly, and are ethical and fair. There may
be many different reasonable and conflicting ethical
stances for a given problem (Haidt, 2013; Singer, 2016;
Gray and Graham, 2018; Corbett-Davies and Goel,
2018; Binns, 2018). Thus, no single strategy for making
machine learning fairer is likely to be sufficient.
In this paper, we show that nonlinear machine learning
can easily produce trained models that violate social
norms or ethics that can be described as: certain inputs
should not have a negative effect on an outcome. For
example, the toy example in Fig. 1 shows a nonlinear
1-d model trained to predict how highly a resume will
be scored based on the candidate’s years of experience.
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The best fit model (purple dashed line) sometimes
penalizes candidates for having more job experience.
For candidates with many years of experience, the
dashed model picked up the age discrimination in the
biased training samples. In addition, the dashed model
also penalizes job experience in the lower-end of years
of experience simply due to overfitting. Such unfair
responses are very much a danger in sparse regions
of a feature space with modern over-parameterized
nonlinear models.
Fig. 1 also illustrates our proposed solution (blue solid
line): train the model with monotonicity shape con-
straints to guarantee that the model can only use job
experience as positive evidence. This is a deontological
solution, and thus differs from many existing mathe-
matical expressions of fairness that are consequentialist
and statistical (Friedler et al., 2019; Hardt et al., 2016;
Binns, 2018; Sandvig et al., 2016). Both types of goals
may be of interest to a practitioner (Sandvig et al.,
2016), and we explore how they relate theoretically and
experimentally.
Figure 1: Toy example showing how a monotonicity
constraint can protect against unfair penalization.
The main contributions of this paper are: (i) identifying
that violations of monotonicity in ML models may pose
significant ethical issues and risk of societal harm, (ii)
demonstrating experimentally that these violations can
easily occur in practice with nonlinear machine learned
models, (iii) showing that existing shape constrained
ML can be used effectively to ameliorate such problems,
and (iv) theoretically and empirically analyzing how the
proposed monotonicity constraints relate to statistical
fairness notions.
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Deontological Ethics By Monotonicity Shape Constraints
Model type # shape Train Test
constraints Acc. Acc.
GAM 0 94.93% 94.89%
GAM 2 94.90% 94.97%
DNN 0 94.97% 94.89%
GBT 0 95.04% 94.80%
Table 1: Law School Admissions Experiment Results.
Two monotonicity constraints ensure that individuals
aren’t penalized for higher GPA or LSAT score.
2 Illustrating Unfair Penalization
To further illustrate the potential for machine-learning
to produce objectionable models, consider the Law
School Admissions dataset (Wightman, 1998). Suppose
this data is used to predict whether a person would
pass the bar exam based on their LSAT score and
undergraduate GPA, and that the classifier’s score was
used to guide law school admissions or scholarships.
We trained a standard two-layer deep neural network
(DNN) (more experimental details in Sec. 8) and show
the model’s output for each possible input in Fig. 2.
The DNN sometimes penalizes people for having a
higher GPA: for example, with an LSAT score of 15,
the DNN rewards students with a lower 2.7 GPA over
students who earned a higher 3.5 GPA. Similarly, if a
student has a GPA of 2.5, the DNN gives that student
a higher score for scoring 10 on the LSAT than if they
had scored 15. Thus this model violates merit-based
social norms and the “best-qualified” ethical principle
(Hunter and Schmidt, 1976) (we also acknowledge that
the very use of standardized test scores or GPA for
allocating goods may raise other ethical issues (Hunter
and Schmidt, 1976)). Training with gradient boosted
trees has the same problem: the model penalizes some
people for raising their GPA or LSAT score.
Each of the two-dimensional models shown in Fig. 2
were trained on 19,064 training examples, which may
sound like plenty of data to learn a model on two inputs,
but the non-uniform distribution of the training data
means that some regions of the feature space were
sparse and the model may have overfit (for a density
plot, see Fig. 9 in the Appendix). These monotonicity
violations can also occur from legitimate, clean data.
To see this, note that how hard it is to get a good
GPA can vary greatly between schools, and imagine as
an extreme example that there was a large university
that simply gave every student a 2.7 GPA, which could
cause some of the problems seen in this model.
Our proposal is to train the model with monotonicity
constraints. An example monotonic model is shown in
(c) of Fig. 2. It is a generalized additive model (GAM)
trained with the constraints that it never penalizes
higher GPA’s for any LSAT score, and that it never
penalizes higher LSAT scores for any GPA. Training the
same GAM without monotonicity constraints is shown
in the lower right, and also produces an objectionable
model. The test accuracies of these four models are
given in Table 1 are similar (more experimental details
in Sec. 8).
3 Monotonicity Fairness Constraints
The motivating examples in Figures 1 and 2 focused on
the concern of unfair penalization – that there may be
inputs that a responsible model may reward but should
never penalize. A second ethical pattern we consider is
to favor the less fortunate – there may be inputs that
help us identify the less fortunate and favor them if
there are no other relevant differences. Policies favoring
the less fortunate have been well studied in economics
(Coate and Loury, 1993). As shown in Figures 1 and
2, we propose addressing these two principles by con-
straining the ML model to only respond positively to
relevant inputs if all other inputs are fixed.
Throughout, we focus on ML models that produce a
score that is used to determine some benefit, such as
a better credit rating or a scholarship. Specifically,
consider a learned model f(x, z) where x ∈ RD is a D-
dimensional feature vector, and z ∈ R is another input
that is of ethical interest (such as age or income). The
model f(x, z) satisfies a positive monotonicity shape
constraint (Groeneboom and Jongbloed, 2014) with
respect to z if for any δ > 0 and any choice of x and
z, f(x, z + δ) ≥ f(x, z). If f is differentiable with re-
spect to z, this constraint is equivalent to non-negative
slope ∂(f(x,z))∂z ≥ 0 for any x, z. Strict monotonicity
replaces the ≥ sign above with >. Reverse definitions
produce negative monotonicity constraints. To apply a
monotonicity shape constraint to a categorical feature,
one can express each category as a Boolean feature
indicating membership in the category.
As defined above, and as is standard in the shape
constraints literature (Groeneboom and Jongbloed,
2014), our proposed monotonicity shape restrictions
are ceterus paribus : that is, f(x) should behave mono-
tonically with respect to increases in each protected
feature z, but only when all other features x are held
fixed. Here we take the input features x as given, but
of course it is also important to have the best possible
set of features x.
4 More Example Scenarios
We further illustrate the critical importance and
breadth of situations in which we need ML models
to behave consistently with a society’s norms or ethical
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(a) Neural Network (b) Grad. Boosted Trees (c) Monotonic GAM (d) GAM
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Figure 2: Real data example predicting if a student will bass the bar. Predictions by a neural network (a)
and gradient boosted trees (b) penalize some students if they increase their GPA or LSAT score. We trained a
generalized additive model (GAM) with constraints to be monotonically increasing in both GPA and LSAT score
(c). The same GAM model trained without monotonicity constraints also violates monotonicity in GPA (d).
policies. Then in Section 8, we show experimentally on
two more problems that nonlinear ML models do not
naturally pick up such norms and policies, and that
training with monotonicity constraints can be used to
incorporate desired policies.
Crimes and Misdemeanors: An ML system trained
to determine fines for misdemeanors would likely be
considered fairer if the fines were monotonically increas-
ing with respect to the magnitude of the illegality, e.g.
a larger fine for illegally parking one’s car for longer,
or for exceeding the speed limit by more (Allen et al.,
2015). Also, in many societies it is expected that a
juvenile will not be penalized more heavily than an
adult for the same crime, all else equal (Allen et al.,
2015). Many societies prefer not to give harsher penal-
ties to first-time offenders than to repeat offenders
(Allen et al., 2015).
Pay: People generally feel it is unfair to get paid less
for doing more of the same work (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999). Suppose a model is trained to advise parents on
how much to pay their babysitter. It may be desirable
to workers if the recommended pay were constrained to
be a monotonically increasing function of the number
of hours worked, all else equal. Similarly, consider an
app that uses an ML model to advise people on how
much to tip their waiter in America. Such a model
would be better aligned with American societal norms
if it recommended larger tips for more expensive meals,
and if it recommended higher tip percentages for more
upscale establishments, all else equal (Azar, 2004).
Medical Triage: In some medical contexts, it is con-
sidered more ethical or more responsible to prioritize
patients based on their risk or neediness (Iserson and
Moksop, 2007). For example, the United States Trans-
plant Board has a policy of giving a sicker person a
higher score to receive a transplant for ethical reasons
(L. Bernstein, 2017). Similarly an emergency room scor-
ing patients for prioritization may require that patients
that have waited longer are treated first, if all other
relevant characteristics are equal (Iserson and Moksop,
2007). More generally, first-come first-served is a com-
mon principle underpinning civil society (Beauchamp
and Childress, 2001; Sugden, 1989).
5 Related Work in Ethical ML
This work fits into the broader literature on machine
ethics (Anderson and Anderson, 2007; Moor, 2006).
Ethics itself is a broad field of philosophy that en-
compasses many questions, and there may be many
different reasonable ethical stances and criteria for a
given problem (Binns, 2018; Thiroux and Krasemann,
2017; Haidt, 2013; Gray and Graham, 2018; Corbett-
Davies and Goel, 2018; Singer, 2016; Gruetzemacher,
2018; Allen et al., 2015; Rawls, 1971).
Deontological: Most recent work in machine learning
fairness has been consequentialist : focusing on ensur-
ing that machine-learned models deliver statistically-
similar performance for different groups (Binns, 2018;
Zafar et al., 2015; Goh et al., 2016; Hardt et al., 2016;
Zafar et al., 2017; Donini et al., 2018; Agarwal et al.,
2018; Goel et al., 2018; Cotter et al., 2019a,b). Those
efforts solve a different important problem than the one
we target here, and are complementary to this proposal.
This proposal is instead deontological, in that it enables
people to impose rules on how the model can respond
to inputs, producing an implicit ethical agent in the ter-
minology of Moor (Moor, 2006). Sandvig et al. recently
called for more research into deontological algorithms,
noting that, “Applied ethics in real-world settings typi-
cally incorporates both rule-based and consequences-
based reasoning” (Sandvig et al., 2016).
Monotonicity and Fairness: Concurrently, Cole
and Williamson (2019) also recognized the importance
of monotonicity in a fairness context. That work differs
in framing: they use monotonicity to reduce unfair
resentment. Our work further differs in its theoretical
results and comparisons.
Asymmetric: Another fairness principle is that simi-
lar individuals should receive similar treatment (Dwork
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et al., 2012); while also important, that principle aims
for equal outcomes for two examples, whereas this pro-
posal aims to make sure that any unequal treatment is
unequal in the appropriate direction, such as favor the
less fortunate.
Counterfactual Fairness: Counterfactual fairness
(Kusner et al., 2017; Pearl et al., 2016) says that chang-
ing a protected attribute A while holding things not
causally dependent on A constant will not change the
distribution of the model output. This is similar to the
definition of monotonicity in section 3, but is focused
on treating certain cases the same rather than prefering
one case to another.
Continuous Sensitive Features: The proposed
monotonicity constraints handles real-valued attributes
natively. Other recent efforts have also been devised
to handle continuous protected attributes, like age, for
consequentialist fairness goals (Raff et al., 2018; Kearns
et al., 2018; Komiyama et al., 2018).
Fair Ranking and Fair Regression: Monotonicity
constraints can be applied to ranking and regression
models. Other notions of ethics have also been con-
sidered for ranking models (Berk et al., 2017; Zehlike
et al., 2017; Celis et al., 2018; Beutel et al., 2019; Singh
and Joachims, 2018) and regression (Komiyama et al.,
2018; Pérez-Suay et al., 2017; Berk et al., 2017; Agarwal
et al., 2019).
6 Related Work in Training Models
with Monotonicity Constraints
Monotonicity shape constraints have long been used
to capture prior knowledge and regularize estimation
problems to improve a model’s generalization to new
test examples (Barlow et al., 1972; Chetverikov et al.,
2018; Ben-David, 1992; Archer and Wang, 1993; Sill
and Abu-Mostafa, 1997; Kotlowski and Slowinski, 2009;
Groeneboom and Jongbloed, 2014; Gupta et al., 2016;
Canini et al., 2016; You et al., 2017; Bonakdarpour
et al., 2018). In this paper, we point out that mono-
tonicity shape constraints can and should also be used
to ensure that machine-learned models behave consis-
tently with societal norms and prima facie duties (Ross,
2002) that can be expressed as monotonic relationships.
Unlike its use for regularization, applying monotonicity
constraints to impose ethical principles may actually
hurt test accuracy if the training and test data is biased
(as in the toy example of Fig. 1). However, in all three
of our real-data experiments the test accuracy was little
changed by adding these constraints (see Section 8 and
Fig. 2 and Appendix D).
Constraining multi-dimensional models to obey mono-
tonic shape constraints has been shown to work for a
variety of function classes, including neural networks
(Archer and Wang, 1993; Sill and Abu-Mostafa, 1997)
and trees (Ben-David, 1992; Kotlowski and Slowinski,
2009; Bonakdarpour et al., 2018).
Our experiments use the open-source TensorFlow Lat-
tice 2.0 package (Google AI Blog, 2020), which enables
training GAMs and lattice models with monotonicity
constraints (Gupta et al., 2016; Canini et al., 2016; You
et al., 2017).
7 Relationship to Statistical Fairness
In this section we analyze how the proposed deonto-
logical monotonicity constraints interact with conse-
quentialist statistical fairness goals that are based on
aggregate outcomes. For example, suppose a national
funding agency enforces that poorer schools are funded
more often as richer schools on average (we will call
this one-sided statistical parity). By only considering
the national average funding rates, richer schools may
still get funded more often than poorer schools in some
states. In contrast, if the state were the only input X,
then a deonotological monotonicity constraint would
guarantee that for each state, poorer schools would get
a higher funding rate than richer schools.
Hardt et al. (2016) showed that any oblivious statis-
tical fairness measure that doesn’t depend on X or
the function form f(X,Z) can fail to identify forms of
discrimination. Popular statistical notions like statisti-
cal parity (Dwork et al., 2012) and equal opportunity
(Hardt et al., 2016) are oblivious, whereas monotonicity
is not. In the next section we show specifically that
satisfying one-sided statistical parity does not imply
monotonicity, but that satisfying monotonicity can im-
pact and bound one-sided statistical parity and equal
opportunity (proofs in Appendix).
7.1 Bounds on One-sided Statistical Parity
Statistical parity is a well known measure of fairness
for ML models (Dwork et al., 2012; Zafar et al., 2015;
Cotter et al., 2019b). Consider a model f(X,Z) that
takes as input a random feature vector X ∈ RD and
a random protected attribute Z, which may be cat-
egorical or real-valued. Suppose the model f out-
puts a real-valued score (we treat the special case
of classifiers next). Then statistical parity requires
E[f(X,Z)|Z = j] = E[f(X,Z)|Z = k] for any j, k.
Because we focus on asymmetric goals like favoring the
less fortunate, we consider one-sided statistical parity:
E[f(X,Z)|Z = j] ≤ E[f(X,Z)|Z = k] for any j ≤ k.
We show in Appendix B.1 that due to Simpson’s para-
dox (Bickel et al., 1975), that a monotonicity constraint
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on Z is not sufficient to guarantee one-sided statisti-
cal parity with respect to Z. However, monotonicity
does imply a bound on the one-sided statistical parity
violation: in Lemma 1, we show that if f is monotonic
with respect to Z, then the one-sided statistical parity
violation between Z = j and Z = k will be bounded by
the maximum density ratio between the two groups.
Figure 3: Illustration of Lemma 1. The dotted line
shows the X value achieving the max density ratio C.
Lemma 1. Let (Ω,F) be a measurable space with a reg-
ular conditional probability property, and let X : Ω→
RD, Z : Ω → R be F-measurable random variables.
Suppose Pj and Pk are σ-finite probability measures
on (Ω,F), where Pj denotes the conditional probability
measure of X given that Z = j, and Pk denote the
same for Z = k, and Pj is absolutely continuous with
respect to Pk. Let f : RD × R → R be defined as in
Section 3, and f(x, z) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ RD, z ∈ R.
If the function f satisfies monotonicity in the second
argument such that for j ≤ k, f(x, j) ≤ f(x, k) for
all x ∈ RD, and if the Radon-Nikodym derivative dPjdPk
is bounded almost everywhere with respect to Pk by a
finite constant C > 0, then
E[f(X,Z)|Z = j] ≤ CE[f(X,Z)|Z = k]. (1)
If the conditional probability distribution of X given
Z = j has density pX|Z=j(x), and X given Z = k
has density pX|Z=k(x), then Lemma 1 says that if the
likelihood ratio pX|Z=j(x)pX|Z=k(x) ≤ C almost everywhere with
respect to Pk for finite C > 0, then the one-sided
statistical parity bound (1) holds.
Fig. 3 illustrates Lemma 1 with an example: suppose
Z is categorical and denotes either a poorer or richer
high school, and suppose D = 1 with X ∈ [0, 20]
being the number of hours of extracurricular activities
a student does each week. Let f(X,Z) be a score used
to determine a student’s admission to some college.
Then if f is monotonic in Z such that f never gives
a lower admissions score to a poorer student if their
X value is the same as a richer student, then Lemma
1 says that the average score for richer students will
be no more than C times the average score for poorer
students, where C is given by the maximum ratio of
the two distributions over X.
While Lemma 1 shows that monotonicity implies a
bound on the one-sided statistical parity violations, the
converse does not hold: a model satisfying statistical
parity can have arbitrarily high monotonicity viola-
tions (proof in Appendix B.2). This can be ethically
problematic if overlooked by practitioners.
While Lemma 1 provides a worst case bound on the
statistical parity violations of monotonic functions, we
next ask, can imposing monotonicity ever make sta-
tistical parity violations worse? Lemma 2 shows that
for any model f , the monotonic projection of f cannot
have worse statistical parity violations on average.
Lemma 2. Let f : X×Z → R, where X ⊆ RD, Z ⊆ R.
Assume that X ,Z are both finite, with X ∈ X , Z ∈ Z.
Let f˜ be the projection of f onto the set of functions
over X × Z that are monotonic with respect to Z such
that for j ≤ k, f(x, j) ≤ f(x, k). For z(i) ∈ Z, let
z(1) ≤ z(2) ≤ ... ≤ z(|Z|). Define the average statistical
parity violation:
Rf
4
=
|Z|∑
i=1
E[f(X,Z)|Z = z(i)]− E[f(X,Z)|Z = z(i+1)]
|Z|
Then Rf˜ ≤ Rf .
When |Z| = 2, Lemma 2 also bounds the worst case
violation of f˜ . However, for |Z| > 2, there is no such
worst case guarantee, and there may be pairs j, k where
f˜ has a worse one-sided statistical parity violation than
f (proof in Appendix B.3).
7.2 Bounds for Binary Classifiers
In binary classification, an example has an associated
true label Y ∈ {0, 1}, and the model outputs a binary
decision Yˆ ∈ {0, 1}. By definition, a monotonicity
shape constraint on Z implies a one-sided bound on
the conditional probabilities: for any j ≤ k and for all
x, P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = j) ≤ P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = k).
Because the label Y can be modeled as a Bernoulli
random variable, the goal of statistical parity is equiva-
lent to marginal independence, that is, for any j, k,
P (Yˆ = 1|Z = j) = P (Yˆ = 1|Z = k). Cor-
respondingly, the bound (4) on the statistical par-
ity becomes a bound on the marginal probabilities:
P (Yˆ = 1|Z = j) ≤ CP (Yˆ = 1|Z = k).
For binary classifiers, we can give a more explicit bound:
Lemma 3. Suppose X is a continuous (or with a
straightforward extension, discrete) random variable,
and let S be a nonempty set such that for all x ∈ S,
the joint probability density values pX,Yˆ |Z=z(x, 1) > 0
for z = j, k. Suppose we have monotonicity where
f(x, j) ≤ f(x, k) for j ≤ k for all x ∈ S. For a
binary classifier this implies P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = j) ≤
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P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = k). Then we can bound one-sided
statistical parity as follows:
P (Yˆ = 1|Z = j)
P (Yˆ = 1|Z = k) ≤ infx∈S
pX|Z=j(x)pX|Yˆ=1,Z=k(x)
pX|Z=k(x)pX|Yˆ=1,Z=j(x)
The bound in Lemma (3) contains two likelihood ratios:
pX|Z=j(x)
pX|Z=k(x)
and
pX|Yˆ=1,Z=k(x)
pX|Yˆ=1,Z=j(x)
. The first is the same as in
Lemma 1. The second is the inverse of that likelihood
ratio, conditioned on Yˆ = 1. When the first likelihood
ratio is low, the second inverse likelihood ratio may be
high, producing a trade-off between these two ratios.
We describe an example in Appendix C.
Similarly, for equal opportunity (Hardt et al., 2016), we
have Lemma 4:
Lemma 4. Let Y ∈ {0, 1} be a random variable repre-
senting the target. Let S be a nonempty set such that
for all x ∈ S, the following joint probability density val-
ues are non-zero for z = j, k: pX,Y,Yˆ |Z=z(x, 1, 1) > 0
and pX,Y |Yˆ=1,Z=z(x, 1) > 0. Then,
P (Yˆ = 1|Y = 1, Z = j)
P (Yˆ = 1|Y = 1, Z = k) ≤ infx∈S
cj(x)
ck(x)
where cz(x) =
pX|Z=z(x)P (Y = 1|Yˆ = 1, Z = z)
pX|Yˆ=1,Z=z(x)P (Y = 1|Z = z)
We supplement these bounds with empirical results.
8 Experiments
We demonstrate experimentally with three public
datasets that (i) nonlinear ML can violate common eth-
ical policies or norms, (ii) training with monotonicity
constraints can be used to impose such policies to the
extent that the choice of model inputs x enables, (iii)
test accuracy may not be hurt, (iii) statistical fairness
violations may be reduced.
Model training details: Code for these experiments
and further tutorials for using the open-source Ten-
sorFlow Lattice 2.0 library (Google AI Blog, 2020)
are available at https://github.com/tensorflow/
lattice/blob/master/docs/tutorials/. All exper-
iments used a nonlinear generalized additive model
(GAM) (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990), also called a
calibrated linear model in the TensorFlow Lattice, of
the form f(x) =
∑D
d=1 cd(x[d];βd), where each cd(·) is
an one-dimensional piecewise-linear function parame-
terized by K interpolated (key, value) pairs where the
keys are set to match the K quantiles of the train-
ing data and their corresponding values βd ∈ RK are
trained (Gupta et al., 2016). We used a fixed K = 20
parameters for each of the D one-dimensional trans-
forms, for all experiments. All DK parameters were
jointly trained using projected stochastic gradient de-
scent. For each input d, one can choose to constrain
f(x) to be monotonically increasing with respect to d
by constraining its one-dimensional curve cd(x[d]) to
be monotonic (Gupta et al., 2016). The TensorFlow
Lattice package enables fitting more flexible monotonic
models, but we felt it was most compelling to show that
these monotonicity violations occur even with simple
nonlinear models like GAMs, which are popular in the
statistics literature. We randomly uniformly split each
dataset into 70% training, 10% validation, and 20%
test examples. We validated the learning rates using
grid search by powers of 10 ensuring that the optimal
learning rates did not fall on the extremes, and trained
for 1000 epochs (more than sufficient for convergence).
8.1 Law School Experiments
In Section 1 we partially described an experiment using
the Law School Admissions dataset (Wightman, 1998).
The dataset has 27,234 total law students, and we
use only two features in all models: GPA and LSAT
scores. We plot the densities of these conditioned on
whether the student passed the bar or not in Fig. 9 in
Appendix D. Models were trained as described above,
where for the constrained model we constrained both
LSAT score and undergraduate GPA to only be positive
evidence, ceterus paribus. The two-layer neural network
and gradient boosted trees models were trained with a
similar number of model parameters to the GAMs and
no monotonicity constraints. Resulting models were
shown in Fig. 2, and train/test accuracies in Table 1.
8.2 Credit Default Experiments
Next, we consider the Default of Credit Card Clients
benchmark dataset from the UCI repository (Lichman,
2013; Yeh and Lien, 2009). The data was collected
from 30,000 Taiwanese credit card users and contains
a binary label of whether or not a user defaulted on a
payment in a time window. Features include marital
status, gender, education, and how long a user is behind
on payment of their existing bills, for each of the months
of April-September 2005.
Repayment status is the integer number of months
it has been since the user has repaid, and negative
values mean the user has already repaid. Here we
illustrate using monotonicity constraints to avoid unfair
penalization: if the model were to be used to determine
a user’s credit score, it could feel unfair to many if
they were penalized for paying their bills sooner, all
else equal. Thus, we apply a monotonicity constraint
that keeps the model from penalizing early payments.
Figure 4 (top) shows the average and standard devia-
tion of the default rate of the training examples as a
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function of the months since the bills were paid. The
data is very noisy for 3+ months overdue payment
(there are only 122 such training examples), and these
noisy averages do not follow the reasonable principle of
predicting a higher default rate if your bills are more
over-due.
For ease of visualization, our first experiment uses only
D = 2 features: marital status and April repayment
status, with a monotonicity shape constraint on the
repayment status to ensure that paying your bills on
time doesn’t hurt you. Our second experiment uses all
D = 24 features, and we impose monotonicity shape
constraints on all 6 repayment features to guarantee
that the person is not penalized for paying early/on-
time during any of the 6 months.
Fig. 5 (top) shows the predicted default rate for the
unconstrained GAM. It mimics the average training
labels, and thus unfairly rewards people who are 5-6
months overdue on their bills with a lower defaulting
score than people who are only 2-3 months overdue.
However, Figure 5 (bottom) shows the GAM trained
with a monotonicity shape constraint: as requested, it
does not penalize people for paying their bills early.
Table 2 shows that adding the monotoniciy constraints
for the Credit Default problem had only a tiny effect on
the train and test accuracy for the D = 2 experiments.
For the D = 24 experiment, the test accuracy is slightly
worse, but since the train accuracy was not hurt, we
believe the lower test accuracy is simply due to the
randomness of the sample.
8.3 Funding Proposals Experiments
Next we demonstrate the use of monotonicity con-
straints to favor the less fortunate. We use the
dataset from the KDD Cup 2014: Predicting Ex-
citement at DonorsChoose.org (KDD Cup, 2014).
DonorsChoose.org is a platform through which teachers
in K-12 schools can request funding and materials for
proposed projects. Donors can search for and donate
to projects. The dataset contains 619,327 examples of
projects proposed by teachers. The label is a binary
label that represents the outcome of the project, where
the positive class means the project was deemed “ex-
citing”, a definition determined by DonorsChoose.org
that includes whether the project was fully funded.
Only 5.91% of examples are labeled “exciting”. Figure
4 (bottom) shows the mean and std. dev. of the train-
ing examples for 2 of the 28 features: poverty level
and number of students impacted. A machine learning
model trained on this dataset could be used to rank
projects to display to potential donors. Standard ma-
chine learning trained on just these two features would
not favor schools at higher poverty levels, or projects
with greater impact. We compare to training with
monotonicity constraints for those two principles, both
on just the shown two features, and on all 28 features
(but only these two features constrained).
The results in Table 3 for the AUC metric (the same
metric used in the KDD Cup 2014 competition) show
that adding monotonicity constraints to prefer poorer
schools and greater student impact did not hurt the test
AUC. Figures comparing the standard and constrained
D = 2 models are in Appendix E.
# features # shape Train Test
constraints Acc. Acc.
2 0 82.07% 81.55%
2 1 82.06% 81.60%
24 0 82.44% 82.02%
24 6 82.35% 80.86%
Table 2: Credit Default experiment results, where the
monotonicity shape constraints ensure the model does
not penalize people for paying their bills earlier.
# features # shape Train Test
constraints AUC AUC
2 0 0.520 0.517
2 2 0.514 0.518
28 0 0.752 0.746
28 2 0.751 0.746
Table 3: Funding Proposals experiment results, where
the monotonicity shape constraints ensure that the
model gives higher scores to projects for higher poverty
schools or impacting more students, all else equal.
8.3.1 Comparison to Statistical Fairness
In Section 6 we gave theoretical results on how mono-
tonicity constraints can bound and affect one-sided
statistical parity and one-sided equal opportunity fair-
ness violations. In Table 4 we show empirically what
happens to the one-sided (1-s) statistical parity and
equal opportunity violations (defined below) for the
Funding Proposals experiment, where the protected
groups j, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} are four different poverty levels,
which we treat as four different ordinal protected groups
for calculating these one-sided statistical metrics.
Max One-sided Statistical Parity Violation:
max
j<k
(0, P (Yˆ = 1|Z = j)− P (Yˆ = 1|Z = k)) (2)
Max One-sided Equal Opportunity Violation:
max
j<k
(0, P (Yˆ = 1|Z = j, Y = 1)
− P (Yˆ = 1|Z = k, Y = 1))
(3)
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Figure 4: Mean and standard error of the label as a
function of the inputs over the training dataset.
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Figure 5: Credit Default: unconstrained model predic-
tions (top) and constrained model predictions (bottom).
Table 4 shows that the monotonically constrained mod-
els do lower violations of both fairness goals. The
improvement is smaller when the model has D = 28
features than D = 2 features, which we believe is due
to a weakening of the maximum likelihood ratios as
described by Lemmas 3 and 4.
D # shape Max 1-s Stat. Max 1-s Eq.
constraints Par. Viol. (2) Opp. Viol. (3)
2 0 0.00704 0.00707
2 2 0.00017 0.00037
28 0 0.00751 0.00397
28 2 0.00261 0.00331
Table 4: Statistical Fairness Violations for Funding
Proposals Experiment.
9 Discussion
We have demonstrated that nonlinear machine learned
models can easily overfit noise or learn bias in a way
that violates social norms or ethics about whether cer-
tain inputs should be allowed to negatively affect a
score or decision. We have also shown that this prob-
lem can be ameliorated by training with monotonicity
constraints to reflect the desired principle.
An advantage of monotonicity constraints is that their
effect does not depend on the data distribution, so there
are no questions of generalization to test data as there
are with statistical fairness measures. While enforcing
such constraints addresses deontological rather than
consequentialist ethics, we have also shown theoreti-
cally and experimentally that monotonicity constraints
can can improve or bound (consequentialist) one-sided
statistical fairness violations.
Monotonicity constraints are fairly easy to explain and
reason about for laypeople, as illustrated in the exam-
ples in this paper. The examples also illustrate the
broad applicability of constraints to situations where
the model should avoid unfair penalization of good
attributes, and favor the less fortunate.
We conclude that monotonicity constraints are a neces-
sary and useful tool for creating responsible AI, but cer-
tainly not sufficient or applicable to all situations. For
this method to be completely effective, all relevant fea-
tures must be identified and constrained. Non-sensitive
information can be highly correlated with sensitive
information, causing indirect discrimination (Hajian
and Domino-Ferrer, 2013), which is also a problem for
statistical fairness measures (Hardt et al., 2016). This
method is also not directly applicable to unordered
inputs like addresses, photos, or voice signals. Thus,
this will be one of many tools and strategies needed to
achieve responsible AI.
Serena Wang, Maya Gupta
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A Proofs
Lemma 1. Let (Ω,F) be a measurable space with a reg-
ular conditional probability property, and let X : Ω→
RD, Z : Ω → R be F-measurable random variables.
Suppose Pj and Pk are σ-finite probability measures
on (Ω,F), where Pj denotes the conditional probability
measure of X given that Z = j, and Pk denote the
same for Z = k, and Pj is absolutely continuous with
respect to Pk. Let f : RD × R → R be defined as in
Section 3, and f(x, z) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ RD, z ∈ R. If
the function f satisfies monotonicity in the second ar-
gument such that f(x, j) ≤ f(x, k) for all x ∈ RD and
for j ≤ k, and if the Radon Nikodym derivative dPjdPk
is bounded almost everywhere with respect to Pk by a
finite constant C > 0, then
E[f(X,Z)|Z = j] ≤ CE[f(X,Z)|Z = k]. (4)
Proof. Under Lemma 1’s assumptions,
E[f(X,Z)|Z = j] =
∫
RD
f(x, j)dPj
≤
∫
RD
f(x, k)dPj
=
∫
RD
f(x, k)
dPj
dPk
dPk
≤ C
∫
RD
f(x, k)dPk
= CE[f(X,Z)|Z = k].
The second inequality follows from monotonicity, and
the third by the Radon Nikodym theorem since Pj <<
Pk.
Lemma 2. Let f : X×Z → R, where X ⊆ RD, Z ⊆ R.
Assume that X ,Z are both finite, with X ∈ X , Z ∈ Z.
Let f˜ be the projection of f onto the set of functions
over X × Z that are monotonic with respect to Z such
that for j ≤ k, f(x, j) ≤ f(x, k). For z(i) ∈ Z, let
z(1) ≤ z(2) ≤ ... ≤ z(|Z|). Define the average statistical
parity violation:
Rf
4
=
|Z|∑
i=1
E[f(X,Z)|Z = z(i)]− E[f(X,Z)|Z = z(i+1)]
|Z|
Then Rf˜ ≤ Rf .
Proof. Let f˜ : X × Z → R be the projection of f
onto the class of functions monotonic in the second
argument, defined as follows:
f˜ = arg min
f ′
||f − f ′||
s.t. f ′(x, j) ≤ f ′(x, k) ∀j, k ∈ Z; j ≤ k
(5)
where
||f − f ′||2 =
∑
x∈X ,z∈Z
(f(x, z)− f ′(x, z))2.
The projection f˜ can be computed in O(|X ||Z|) time
using the pool-adjacent-violators algorithm from iso-
tonic regression (Ayer et al., 1955; JB, 1964), since a
one dimensional projection can be done independently
in O(|Z|) time for each x ∈ X .
Rf is a telescoping sum:
Rf =
E[f(X,Z)|Z = z(1)]− E[f(X,Z)|Z = z(|Z|)]
|Z|
For discrete X and Z, we have
E[f(X,Z)|Z = j] =
∑
x∈X
f(x, j)P (X = x|Z = j)
which implies
Rf =
1
|Z|
∑
x∈X
(
f(x, z(1))P (X = x|Z = z(1))
−f(x, z(|Z|))P (X = x|Z = z(|Z|))
)
.
We now show that f˜(x, z(1)) ≤ f(x, z(1)), and
f˜(x, z(|Z|)) ≥ f(x, z(|Z|)):
Suppose f˜(x, z(1)) > f(x, z(1)). Then we can set
f˜ ′(x, z(1)) = f(x, z(1)) without violating the monotonic-
ity constraints, and ||f − f˜ ′|| < ||f − f˜ ||, which con-
tradicts that f˜ solves (5). A similar argument can be
made for z(|Z|).
Since f˜(x, z(1)) ≤ f(x, z(1)) and
f˜(x, z(|Z|)) ≥ f(x, z(|Z|)), we have
f(x, z(1))P (X = x|Z = z(1))
− f(x, z(|Z|))P (X = x|Z = z(|Z|))
≥ f˜(x, z(1))P (X = x|Z = z(1))
− f˜(x, z(|Z|))P (X = x|Z = z(|Z|))
Since the above inequality is true for all x, it holds for
the sum over x ∈ X , therefore Rf˜ ≤ Rf .
Lemma 3. Suppose X is a continuous (or with a
straightforward extension, discrete) random variable,
and let S be a nonempty set such that for all x ∈ S,
the joint probability density values pX,Yˆ |Z=z(x, 1) > 0
for z = j, k. Suppose we have monotonicity where
f(x, j) ≤ f(x, k) for j ≤ k for all x ∈ S. For a
binary classifier this implies P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = j) ≤
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P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = k). Then we can bound one-sided
statistical parity as follows:
P (Yˆ = 1|Z = j)
P (Yˆ = 1|Z = k) ≤ infx∈S
pX|Z=j(x)pX|Yˆ=1,Z=k(x)
pX|Z=k(x)pX|Yˆ=1,Z=j(x)
Proof. Fix x ∈ S. By Bayes’ theorem and monotonic-
ity,
P (Yˆ = 1|Z = j)
= P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = j) pX|Z=j(x)
pX|Yˆ=1,Z=j(x)
≤ P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = k) pX|Z=j(x)
pX|Yˆ=1,Z=j(x)
= P (Yˆ = 1|Z = k)
pX|Yˆ=1,Z=k(x)
pX|Z=k(x)
pX|Z=j(x)
pX|Yˆ=1,Z=j(x)
Since the inequality holds for all x ∈ S, the tightest
bound holds for the infimum.
Lemma 4. Let Y ∈ {0, 1} be a random variable repre-
senting the target. Let S be a nonempty set such that
for all x ∈ S, the following joint probability density val-
ues are non-zero for z = j, k: pX,Y,Yˆ |Z=z(x, 1, 1) > 0
and pX,Y |Yˆ=1,Z=z(x, 1) > 0. Then,
P (Yˆ = 1|Y = 1, Z = j)
P (Yˆ = 1|Y = 1, Z = k) ≤ infx∈S
cj(x)
ck(x)
where cz(x) =
pX|Z=z(x)P (Y = 1|Yˆ = 1, Z = z)
pX|Yˆ=1,Z=z(x)P (Y = 1|Z = z)
Proof. Let S be a nonempty set such that for all x ∈ S,
the following joint probability density values are non-
zero for z = j, k:
pX,Y,Yˆ |Z=z(x, 1, 1) > 0 and pX,Y |Yˆ=1,Z=z(x, 1) > 0
Fix x ∈ S.
Suppose we have a monotonic binary classifier, where
P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = j) ≤ P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = k) for
j ≤ k.
By Bayes’ theorem, we have
P (Y = 1|Z = j)P (Yˆ = 1|Y = 1, Z = j)pX|Y=1,Yˆ=1,Z=j(x)
= pX|Z=j(x)P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = j)P (Y = 1|X = x, Yˆ = 1, Z = j)
and pX|Yˆ=1,Z=j(x)P (Y = 1|X = x, Yˆ = 1, Z = j)
= pX|Y=1,Yˆ=1,Z=j(x)P (Y = 1|Yˆ = 1, Z = j)
Let cz(x) =
pX|Z=z(x)P (Y=1|Yˆ=1,Z=z)
pX|Y=1,Z=z(x)P (Y=1|Z=z) . This is well de-
fined for x ∈ S.
Combining both applications of Bayes’ theorem and
the monotonicity assumption:
P (Yˆ = 1 |Y = 1, Z = j)
=
pX|Z=j(x)P (Y = 1|X = x, Yˆ = 1, Z = j)
P (Y = 1|Z = j)pX|Y=1,Yˆ=1,Z=j(x)
∗ P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = j)
=
pX|Z=j(x)P (Y = 1|Yˆ = 1, Z = j)
P (Y = 1|Z = j)pX|Yˆ=1,Z=j(x)
∗ P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = j)
= cj(x)P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = j)
≤ cj(x)P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = k)
=
cj(x)
ck(x)
P (Yˆ = 1|Y = 1, Z = k)
Since this holds for all x ∈ S, it holds for the infimum.
B Counterexamples
To supplement Section 7, we give various counterexam-
ples showing that certain relations between statistical
parity and monotonicity do not hold.
B.1 Monotonicity does not imply statistical
parity.
We show that monotonic function f may violate one-
sided statistical parity by an example that illustrates
Simpson’s paradox. Suppose X ∈ {0, 1}, where X = 1
means a law student passed the bar and X = 0 means
the student did not. Let Z ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} be the poverty
level of the student, where Z = 3 represents the highest
poverty level. Suppose f(X,Z), or the admissions score,
is monotonic in Z and takes the values shown in Fig.
6. Suppose that the distributions P (X = x|Z = z)
are given by figure 7. Then the maximum one-sided
statistical parity violation is
E[f(X,Z)|Z = 1]− E[f(X,Z)|Z = 2]
= f(0, 1)P (X = 0|Z = 1)− f(0, 2)P (X = 0|Z = 2)
− f(1, 1)P (X = 0|Z = 1) + f(1, 2)P (X = 0|Z = 2)
= 1.5(0.9)− 1.5(0.1)
= 1.2.
Thus, there is a positive one-sided satistical parity
violation even though f(X,Z) is monotonic in Z.
This violation comes from the fact that even though
f(0, 1) ≤ f(0, 2), this is outweighed by the fact that
P (X = 0|Z = 1) ≥ P (X = 1|Z = 2). This illus-
trates that for a monotonic function, the statistical
parity violation depends on the conditional probabil-
ities P (X = x|Z = z), and indeed Lemma 1 bounds
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the one-sided statistcal parity violation by a ratio of
conditional probabilities.
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Figure 6: Monotonic admissions scores for Counterex-
amples B.1 and B.3.
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Figure 7: Distribution of X,Z for Counterexamples
B.1 and B.3. The displayed values are P (X = x|Z = z)
for X ∈ {0, 1} and Z ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
B.2 Statistical Parity does not imply a
bound on monotonicity violations.
We show that the converse of Lemma 1 does not hold:
a model that satisfies statistical parity may have arbi-
trarily high monotonicity violations regardless of the
likeihood ratio C. Suppose the distribution of men
and women for a given height x is equal for all heights,
such that C = 1. Suppose that statistical parity is
satisfied such that men and women were equally likely
to be selected for a sports team on average.Statistical
parity could hold if the model accepted all men over
some height h that splits the population in half (say
h = 5′8′′), and accepted all women under height h. But
then for a height less than h, P (Yˆ = 1|Z = female) = 0
while P (Yˆ = 1|Z = male) = 1, and for height over
h, P (Yˆ = 1|Z = male) = 0 while P (Yˆ = 1|G =
female) = 1. Therefore, neither a positive nor a neg-
ative monotonicity constraint holds: there is no con-
stant C ′ > 0 such that P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = male) ≤
C ′P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = female) or P (Yˆ = 1|X =
x, Z = female) ≥ C ′P (Yˆ = 1|X = x, Z = male) for all
x.
B.3 Monotonic projection can be more
unfair in the worst case.
While Lemma 2 shows that projecting a function onto
monotonicity constraints cannot increase the average
one-sided statistical parity violation, it can increase
violations in the worst case. Consider a continuation
of the example from B.1, but this time let f(X,Z) be
defined by Fig. 8, and let f˜(X,Z) be defined by Fig. 6.
In this case, Fig. 6 is the monotonic projection of Fig.
8. Then the worst case statistical parity violation for
the monotonic projection f˜ is higher than the worst
case statistical parity violation for the non-monotonic
f :
E[f˜(X,Z)|Z = 1]− E[f˜(X,Z)|Z = 2]
= 1.5(0.9)− 1.5(0.9)
= 1.2
E[f(X,Z)|Z = 1]− E[f(X,Z)|Z = 2]
= 1.0(0.9)− 0.5(0.9)
= 0.85
For a given pair j, k, as long as f˜(x, j) ≤ f(x, j) and
f˜(x, k) ≥ f(x, k), then the violation
Rf (j, k) = E[f(X,Z)|Z = j]− E[f(X,Z)|Z = k]
will not be worse for the monotonic projection f˜ :
Rf˜ (j, k) ≤ Rf (j, k). Lemma 2 holds because the in-
equalities f˜(x, j) ≤ f(x, j) and f˜(x, k) ≥ f(x, k) hold
for j = z(1) and k = z(|Z|), but this counterexample
exists because those inequalities do not necessarily hold
for any other pairs j, k in between.
C Tradeoff between likelihood ratios
in Lemma 3
The bound in Lemma 3 contains two likelihood ratios:
pX|Z=j(x)
pX|Z=k(x)
and
pX|Yˆ=1,Z=k(x)
pX|Yˆ=1,Z=j(x)
. When the first likelihood
ratio is low, the second inverse likelihood ratio may be
high. For example, suppose Z is an individual’s poverty
level (j being low poverty and k being high poverty), X
is the number of extracurricular activities the individual
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Figure 8: Nonmonotonic admissions scores for Coun-
terexample B.3.
is involved in, and Yˆ = 1 means the individual is
accepted into university. Suppose all individuals with
above a certain number of extracurricular activities is
accepted. Then the first likelihood ratio could be low
when the number of extracurricular activities X is low.
Similarly, the likelihood that a high poverty individual
accepted into university has a low number of extra
curricular activities is probably also higher than the
likelihood that a low poverty individual accepted into
university has a low number of extracurricular activities.
This implies that the second inverse likelihood ratio
would be high, thus trading off with the first likelihood
ratio.
D Further Analysis of Law School
Admissions Experiments
Figure 9 shows the distribution of the LSAT scores, un-
dergraduate GPA, and bar exam outcomes. Examples
where the bar exam outcome was missing were omitted
in our experiments.
E Further Analysis of Funding
Proposals Experiments
Figure 10 gives a histogram of the four different poverty
levels, which are ordinal with level 3 being the most
impoverished.
Figure 11 (top) shows the training examples’ average
number of exciting projects, where the error bars show
the standard error of the mean. The poverty level
feature ranges from 0 to 3, with 0 denoting low poverty
and 3 denoting the highest poverty level. For ease of
visualization, we show the quartiles of the students-
reached feature.
Figure 11 (middle) shows the predicted probability
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Figure 9: Distribution over the full Law School Admis-
sions dataset of undergraduate GPA and LSAT score
students for students that passed the bar exam (top)
and students that failed the bar exam (bottom).
The dataset consists of 94.86% students that passed
the bar exam.
that a project is exciting for a GAM model without
the proposed ethical constraints. The model gives
lower scores to poverty level 2 (poorer schools) than
to poverty level 1 (richer schools) for every quartile of
students reached. The model also gives higher scores
for project that reach 30-100 students tahn to projects
that reach 100+ students.
Figure 11 (bottom) shows that training with an ethi-
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cal monotonicity shape constraint works: at the same
poverty level, projects that affect more students are
given a higher score. For the same quartile of students
reached, the score also does not decrease for higher
poverty levels.
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Figure 10: Histogram of the poverty level feature from
the Funding Proposals dataset. 0 represents lowest
poverty and 3 represents highest poverty.
Funding Proposals: Training Examples
Funding Proposals: Unconstrained Model Predictions
Funding Proposals: Monotonic Model Predictions
Figure 11: (top) Plot of the observed rate of excit-
ing projects (mean number of exciting projects) as a
function of each project’s poverty level and number
of students reached. Error bars show the standard
deviation. (middle) Unconstrained model predictions.
(bottom) Shape-constrained model predictions.
